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A-R-C-G- IS NOT THE SOLUTION FOR DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE VICTIMS 
Lizbeth M. Chow+ 
Sometimes love hurts.  In fact, research shows that thirty percent of women 
worldwide will experience domestic violence at some time in their lives. 1  
National studies in the United States and Britain show that men also experience 
domestic violence at high levels. 2   Even more disturbing is the cultural 
acceptance that domestic violence receives throughout the world. 3   This 
acceptance has left far too many people unprotected and has forced them to seek 
refuge outside of their home countries.4 
                                                        
 + J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2016; B.S., Georgetown 
University, 2008.  Thank you to Professor David Koelsch for your editing and advice on this 
Comment.  Thank you to all members of Catholic University Law Review for their editing, 
particularly to Shannon McGovern.  Mom, Dad, Leo, Vero, Alex, and Jeff: thank you for your 
support during the writing of this Comment, and always. 
 1. Violence against women: a ‘global health problem of epidemic proportions’, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. (June 20, 2013), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2013/violence_ 
against_women_20130620/en/. 
 2. According to a study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 22.3% of 
American women and 14.0% of American men aged eighteen and older “have been the victim of 
severe physical violence by an intimate partner in their lifetime.”  Intimate Partner Violence: 
Consequences, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/ 
violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/consequences.html. “More than 1 in 3 women (35.6%) 
and more than 1 in 4 men (28.5%) in the United States have experienced rape, physical violence, 
and/or stalking by an intimate partner in their lifetime.”  MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 2 (Nov. 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/ 
pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf.  Additionally, a survey of British criminal statistics found “that men 
made up about 40% of domestic violence victims each year between 2004-05 and 2008-09,” and 
48.6% of men were subjected to severe force in an incident with their partner in 2006-07.  Denis 
Campbell, More than 40% of domestic violence victims are male, report reveals, THE GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 4, 2010, 7:07 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2010/sep/05/men-victims-
domestic-violence. 
 3. One study found that “in 29 countries around the world, one-third or more of men say it 
can be acceptable for a husband to ‘beat his wife.’”  Additionally, the study found that “in 19 
countries, one-third or more of women agree that a husband who beats his wife may be justified, at 
least some of the time.”  Nurith Aizenman, Alarming Number of Women Think Spousal Abuse is 
Sometimes OK, NPR (Mar. 18, 2015, 12:16 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/goatsand 
soda/2015/03/18/392860281/alarming-number-of-women-think-spousal-abuse-is-sometimes-ok. 
 4. See, e.g., In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 928 (B.I.A. 1999) (reviewing a Guatemalan 
domestic violence victim’s asylum claim, but ultimately ordering her voluntary departure in lieu of 
deportation back to her home country); Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388–89 (B.I.A. 
2014) (reviewing an Immigration Judge’s decision to deport a Guatemalan domestic violence 
victim and her three children); Matter of L-R-, UNIV. OF CAL., HASTINGS COLL. OF THE LAW, CTR. 
FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/matter-l-r (last visited 
Aug. 19, 2016) (detailing a Mexican asylum-seekers experiences with domestic violence). 
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In the United States, an asylum claim 5  requires that the applicant be a 
refugee—that is, a person fleeing persecution based on race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group (PSG).6  
For a claim that does not fall into one of the first four enumerated forms of 
persecution, a person’s only option for obtaining refugee status is to establish 
membership in a PSG.  The problem is that guidance about what does or does 
not constitute a PSG has been generated on a case-by-case basis,7 leading to 
confusing and inconsistent decision-making. 8   This has been particularly 
consequential for domestic violence victims seeking asylum.9  Such persons 
cannot neatly claim membership in a PSG because it is difficult to show: (1) the 
existence of a group when only two individuals are involved, (2) that the 
persecution stems from membership in that group, and (3) that the government 
in the home country is unable or unwilling to protect the victim.10  As a result, 
victims are left with an unclear strategy. 
Recently, however, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that victims 
fleeing domestic violence might qualify for PSG-based asylum. 11   But the 
decision was only a nominal victory for these refugees because it did not clarify 
when domestic violence rises to the level of persecution and provided no 
analysis on the nexus requirement (the requirement that the applicant 
                                                        
 5. An application for asylum can be made in two ways.  First, individuals who have been 
placed in removal proceedings may apply for asylum as a defense to removal by filing with the 
Immigration Court.  NAT’L IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CTR., BASIC PROCEDURAL MANUAL FOR 
ASYLUM REPRESENTATION AFFIRMATIVELY AND IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 9 (May 2016), 
http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/NIJC%20Asylum%20Manual_05%20
2016_final.pdf.  Second, asylum-seekers who are not in removal proceedings may apply for asylum 
with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).  Id.  If an applicant is denied asylum, 
removal proceedings start and the asylum application is forwarded to an Immigration Court for 
review.  Id.  An Immigration Judge (IJ) will make a final decision on whether asylum is granted or 
denied.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 8 (last revised June 10, 
2013), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/02/02/practice_manual_review.pdf.  If 
denied, the applicant can appeal the IJ’s decision to the BIA.  Id. at 8–9.  However, the BIA’s 
decisions may be reviewable by the U.S. Attorney General (AG).  Id. at 9.  The AG may request 
review (and issue a decision) of the specific case sua sponte, or the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) or the BIA may make a request to the AG for review of the case.  Id.  The asylum-
seeker can appeal the BIA decision to a federal court of appeal.  Id.  That decision, of course, may 
then be appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 
 6. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C., ch. 12). 
 7. See infra Sections I.D.3.b.i–I.D.3.b.iii (explaining the three elements of membership in a 
particular social group and describing several cases from which those elements derived). 
 8. Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 Case 
Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 109 & n.9 
(2013). 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Lynn Bayes-Weiner, Note, “Family Broils” and Private Terror: A Gender-Neutral, 
Psychologically-Based Approach to Domestic Violence and Asylum Law, 79 UMKC L. REV. 1047, 
1054–55 (2011). 
 11. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388–89 (B.I.A. 2014). 
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demonstrate the persecution was “on account of” one of the enumerated 
grounds).12  The BIA failed to provide a predictable rule for both future asylum 
applicants and adjudicators. 
This Comment will assess the BIA’s most recent decision on asylum for 
domestic violence victims and suggest that it is ultimately ineffective.  This 
Comment further suggests that the only practical solution is for Congress to 
intervene.  This Comment first provides a brief historical overview of asylum 
law to help elucidate the purpose of asylum law.  It also provides an in-depth 
review of the elements needed to establish a successful asylum claim and 
surveys how previous domestic violence-based claims have fared.  Next, this 
Comment examines and appraises various existing proposals for addressing the 
issue of domestic violence-based asylum.  Finally, this Comment proposes two 
possible changes to the refugee definition that would more adequately address 
the issue of domestic violence-based asylum.  This Comment also anticipatorily 
rebuts the argument that granting asylum to domestic violence victims, as a 
matter of law, would lead to a drastic increase in this type of asylum application.  
This Comment will conclude that the decision in In re A-R-C-G- does not 
provide an adequate solution for domestic violence victims seeking asylum.  
Moreover, it is time for the United States to amend its refugee definition to 
explicitly extend protection (via asylum) to domestic violence victims. 
I.  ASYLUM LAW: ITS PURPOSE, HISTORY, AND MECHANICS 
A.  A Brief History of International Asylum Law 
Faced with eleven million displaced Europeans 13  and immense “postwar 
shame”14 following the end of World War II, the international community began 
to draft refugee law.15  In 1948, the United Nations (UN) adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR)16—the first international recognition 
of an obligation to protect people outside a country’s own borders.17 
                                                        
 12. Asylum Law—Membership in a Particular Social Group—Board of Immigration Appeals 
Holds that Guatemalan Woman Fleeing Domestic Violence Meets Threshold Asylum 
Requirement.—Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 2090, 
2095 (2015) [hereinafter Asylum Law]. 
 13. Liisa H. Malkki, Refugees and Exile: From “Refugee Studies” to the National Order of 
Things, 24 ANN. REV. OF ANTHROPOLOGY 495, 497 & n.1 (1995). 
 14. Id. at 500 (describing the sense of shame throughout Europe that stemmed from the 
knowledge that so many who had sought asylum during the Holocaust were turned away and 
knowingly returned to face death in their home countries). 
 15. Id. (“The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948, as was the 
Genocide Convention.”). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Article 14.1 of the Declaration stated that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy 
in other countries asylum from persecution.”  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), www.un.org/en/documents/udhr. 
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Three years later, the UN adopted the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1951 Convention),18  which provided the international community 
with the first definition of a refugee19  and established the non-refoulement 
principle.20  The 1951 Convention was monumental because it was the first time 
the international community recognized a duty to protect people against their 
own government.21  But it was limited in scope because it was only intended to 
deal with those displaced as a result of the Holocaust.22   To remedy these 
limitations, the UN developed the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1967 Protocol),23 which incorporated the previous refugee definition 
and “removed the Eurocentric geographical restriction and the war-linked time 
restriction.”24 
B.  Reluctant Adoption of Asylum Law in the United States 
Like most countries, the concept of asylum law had not been developed in the 
United States prior to World War II.25  Furthermore, the United States did not 
make itself party to the 1951 Convention.26  Instead, Congress quietly addressed 
the refugee issue in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by 
including a provision that gave the Attorney General discretionary authority to 
“withhold deportation of any alien . . . [who] would be subject to physical 
persecution . . . .”27 
In 1968, the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol, but Congress did not 
enact legislation to implement the policies of the 1967 Protocol.28  It was not 
                                                        
 18. Malkki, supra note 13, at 501. 
 19. The 1951 Convention defined a refugee as 
[A]ny person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country . . . . 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html. 
 20. Id. at 176.  The non-refoulement principle requires that refugees should not be returned 
to their home country if they would be subject to persecution.  REGINA GERMAIN, AILA’S ASYLUM 
PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.1.1 (6th ed. 2010). 
 21. See Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA L. REV. 733, 734–
35 (1998). 
 22. Malkki, supra note 13, at 501.  The 1951 Convention was “only intended to address the 
European refugee situation (covering events occurring before January 1, 1951) and not refugees as 
a universal phenomenon.”  Id. 
 23. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ae4.html. 
 24. Malkki, supra note 13, at 501; see also GERMAIN, supra note 20, at § 1.1.1. 
 25. Katherine E. Melloy, Telling Truths: How the REAL ID Act’s Credibility Provisions Affect 
Women Asylum Seekers, 92 IOWA L. REV. 637, 643 (2007). 
 26. Id. at 644. 
 27. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214. 
 28. Melloy, supra note 25, at 644. 
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until 1980, that Congress passed the Refugee Act29  to bring U.S. law into 
conformity with the 1967 Protocol.30  The Refugee Act adopted a definition of 
refugee similar to that used by the UN:31 
The term ‘refugee’ means any person who is outside any country of 
such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return 
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded 
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .32 
Notably, the U.S. refugee definition expanded the 1951 Convention definition 
by allowing refugee status on the basis of past persecution as well as potential 
future persecution. 33   Problematically, though, additional guidance was not 
provided as to exactly what circumstances would permit protection on the basis 
of future persecution. 
C.  Expansion of Asylum Law in the United States 
American asylum law underwent two major changes in 1996 that expanded 
its scope and allowed for an increase of applicants.  First, Congress passed the 
Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 34  in 
response to the influx of Chinese nationals claiming to be fleeing coercive 
domestic population control measures.35  The IIRIRA added a sentence to the 
end of the definition of “refugee”36 that specifically dictates what constitutes 
past and future persecution for Chinese nationals fleeing on the basis of domestic 
                                                        
 29. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 
8 U.S.C., ch. 12). 
 30. GERMAIN, supra note 20, at § 1.2.1. 
 31. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html. 
 32. § 201(a), 94 Stat. at 102. (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000)). 
 33. See Melloy, supra note 25, at 644. 
 34. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 601, 110 Stat. 3009-689 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012)). 
 35. Kyle R. Rabkin, Comment, The Zero-Child Policy: How the Board of Immigration 
Appeals Discriminates Against Unmarried Asylum-Seekers Fleeing Coercive Family Planning 
Measures, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 965, 974–75 (2007). 
 36. The sentence added to the refugee definition reads: 
For the purposes of determination under this Act, a person who has been forced to abort 
a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for 
failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive 
population control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of 
political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced 
to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or 
resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of 
political opinion. 
§ 601, 110 Stat. at 3009-689. 
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population control. 37   Second, the BIA held that female genital mutilation 
(FGM) could form the basis for a claim of persecution.38 
D.  Elements to Construct an Asylum Application 
To make a valid asylum claim, an applicant must show that (1) he or she has 
been or will be subject to persecution, (2) his or her fear of persecution is well-
founded, (3) the persecution was on account of membership in a protected class, 
and (4) he or she is outside his or her home country and is unable or unwilling 
to return to his or her home country because of a well-founded fear of 
persecution.39 
1.  Past or Future Persecution 
The definition of “persecution” is ambiguous under U.S. law.40  However, in 
In re Acosta,41 the BIA defined persecution as “a threat to the life or freedom of, 
or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who differ in a way regarded 
as offensive.” 42   The BIA also specified that “a government, or persons a 
government is unwilling or unable to control” must inflict the harm.43  Thus, an 
asylum applicant must prove that the government failed to adequately protect 
him or her and that he or she suffered harm beyond some unspecified threshold 
level.44 
                                                        
 37. “The amendment was driven in part by the controversy in the U.S. over abortion rights  . 
. . anti-abortion groups successfully pressed Congress to oppose coercive family planning.”  
Michelle Chen, Leaving One-Child Behind: Chinese immigrants seek asylum in America from 
China’s one-child policy, LEGALAFFAIRS, http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-Dece 
mber-2005/scene_chen_novdec05.msp (last visited Aug. 11, 2016).  There appears to be no such 
movement behind domestic violence. 
 38. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 39. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 218–19 (B.I.A. 1985) (“A grant of asylum is a 
matter of discretion.  However, an alien is eligible for a favorable exercise of discretion only if he 
qualifies as a ‘refugee’ under section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act.” (citations omitted)), overruled in 
part by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 441 (B.I.A. 1987). 
 40. See Scott Rempell, Defining Persecution, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 283, 283–84 (2013) 
(“Persecution . . . remains largely undefined.  The vagueness is at least partially intentional.  Both 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the immigration regulations purposefully omit any 
explanation of the meaning of persecution, thus leaving the task to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (Board) and the federal courts of appeals.”). 
 41. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 42. Id. at 222. 
 43. Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365 (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222–23). 
 44. In re O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 23, 25–26 (B.I.A. 1998).  Through subsequent cases, 
the BIA and the federal courts have attempted to delineate the boundaries of what may constitute 
persecution, though they have avoided bright line rules.  See Rempell, supra note 40, at 284.  
Accordingly, persecution “encompasses a variety of forms of adverse treatment, including ‘non-
life threatening violence and physical abuse or non-physical forms of harm’  . . . .”  Ivanishvili v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 340–41 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).  But it “does not 
encompass all treatment that society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”  
In re V-T-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 792, 798 (B.I.A. 1997).  Finally, the BIA has held that the harm 
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2.  Well-Founded Fear 
Another element to be proven in an asylum application is a “well-founded 
fear” of persecution45—that is, there must be a rationally identifiable basis for 
the fear.46   Applicants that are found to have suffered past persecution are 
afforded a rebuttable presumption of the existence of a well-founded fear of 
further or future persectuion.47 
3.  Persecution “on Account of” Membership in a Protected Class 
a.  The Nexus Requirement 
Once an asylum applicant establishes that he or she was subjected to 
persecution or has a well-founded fear of persecution, he or she must then 
demonstrate that the persecution is “on account of” one of the five enumerated 
grounds.48  This is known as the nexus requirement.  The Real ID Act of 200549 
requires that an applicant show that one of the enumerated categories “was or 
will be at least one central reason” for the persecution.50 
b.  The Five Enumerated Categories 
Lastly, the applicant must establish that the persecution was due to “race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”51  In the case of domestic violence victims, the only realistic option is 
membership in a PSG. 52   Congress has not addressed the grounds for 
establishing membership of a PSG.53  Rather, they have been developed through 
                                                        
suffered must constitute more than “mere discrimination and harassment” for persecution to be 
found.  O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 25. 
 45. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 219. 
 46. GERMAIN, supra note 20, at § 2.4.4 (“To establish a ‘well-founded fear of persecution,’ 
an asylum applicant must show that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would fear 
persecution if removed to his or her home country.”). 
 47. Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 18 (B.I.A. 1989); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2013). 
 48. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012); see also I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481–82 
(1992). 
 49. Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231. 
 50. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
 51. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2013). 
 52. Although some have made asylum claims based on the political opinion ground, and some 
Immigration Judges have imputed one of the other four grounds as the basis for granting asylum, 
the vast majority of the applicants claiming domestic violence as persecution use the particular 
social group category.  Bayes-Weiner, supra note 10, at 1055. 
 53. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) has defined a 
“particular social group” as: 
[A] group of persons who share a common characteristic other than their risk of being 
persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society.  The characteristic will often be 
one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, 
conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights. 
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BIA decisions,54 which have generated three elements of membership in a PSG: 
(1) a common immutable characteristic, (2) particularity, and (3) social 
distinction.55 
i.  Common Immutable Characteristic 
The first element was initially introduced in In re Acosta,56 in which the BIA 
used the “well-established doctrine of ejusdem generis” to limit the scope of the 
PSG category in order to maintain the integrity of the refugee definition.57  
Applying that doctrine, the BIA determined: “[W]e interpret the phrase 
‘persecution on account of membership in a particular social group’ to mean 
persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of 
persons, all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.”58  Further, the 
BIA stated that such a “characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, 
or kinship ties, or . . . a shared past experience.”59 
ii.  Particularity of Group 
In the 2006 case In re C-A-,60 the BIA officially recognized the “particularity” 
requirement for PSG first mentioned in In re Acosta.61  And in 2014, it clarified 
that particularity is a separate and distinct requirement to the common 
immutable characteristic requirement. 62   Further, it explained that the 
particularity requirement refers to the “group’s boundaries” or “outer limits” 
                                                        
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No. 2: “Membership of 
a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002).  
Additionally, the UNHCR has provided that “[p]ersecution is normally related to action by the 
authorities of a country.”  U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 
for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1992). However, “[i]t may also emanate 
from sections of the population that do not respect the standards established by the laws of the 
country concerned.”  Id. 
 54. See infra Sections I.D.3.b.i–I.D.3.b.iii. 
 55. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 56. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 213 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 57. Id. at 233.  “Only when this is the case does the mere fact of group membership become 
something comparable to the other four grounds of persecution . . . .  [I]n this manner, we preserve 
the concept that refuge is restricted to individuals who are . . .  unable . . . to avoid persecution.”  
Id. at 233–34. 
 58. Id. at 233. 
 59. Id.  Although determination of which types of characteristics would be made on a case-
by-case basis, “whatever the common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the 
members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is 
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”  Id. 
 60. 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006). 
 61. Id. at 955, 961 (holding that noncriminal drug informants working against the Cali drug 
cartel in Colombia were not members of a particular social group). 
 62. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 232 (B.I.A. 2014). 
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because a group cannot comprise an entire society nor consist of an individual 
with no one else.63 
iii.  Social Visibility to Social Distinction 
In In re C-A-, the BIA held that “[t]he social visibility of the members of a 
claimed social group is an important consideration in identifying the existence 
of a particular social group for the purpose of determining whether a person 
qualifies as a refugee.” 64   One year later, in In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 65  it 
reaffirmed and explained that “[w]hether a proposed group has a shared 
characteristic with the requisite ‘social visibility’ must be considered in the 
context of the country of concern and the persecution feared.”66  In other words, 
a claimed PSG must be recognized as such a group within the asylum-seeker’s 
country.67  Following significant confusion about this factor, the BIA renamed 
the “social visibility” requirement as “social distinction.” 68   Moreover, it 
clarified that “literal or ‘ocular’ visibility” was not necessary.69  Rather, the 
“‘social distinction’ requirement considers whether those with a common 
immutable characteristic are set apart, or distinct, from other persons within the 
society . . . .”70 
iv.  Elements of a PSG Summarized 
In summary, an applicant that claims asylum on account of membership in a 
PSG “must establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a 
common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) 
socially distinct within the society in question.”71  Domestic violence asylum 
applicants have struggled to satisfy these requirements and have scarcely 
received guidance from the BIA regarding how to successfully bring a domestic 
violence-based claim.72 
4.  Inability or Unwillingness to Return to the Home Country 
In order to meet the statutory definition of refugee, an asylum applicant must 
also be “unable or unwilling to return to” their home country due to fear of 
                                                        
 63. Id. at 238. 
 64. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006). 
 65. 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007). 
 66. Id. at 74. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 228 (B.I.A. 2014); see also Matter of W-
G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 212 (B.I.A. 2014) (“By renaming this requirement, we intend to clarify 
that the criteria of particularity and social distinction are consistent with both the language of the 
Act and our earlier precedent decisions.”). 
 69. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 228. 
 70. Id. at 238. 
 71. Id. at 237. 
 72. See discussion infra Sections I.E.1–I.E.3. 
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persecution.73  This element arises from the non-refoulement principle, which 
protects an asylum seeker from being removed to a country where “his [or her] 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”74  
Such fears must be “well-founded,” meaning that a reasonable person in the 
asylum seeker’s circumstances would also fear persecution if he or she returned 
to the home country. 75   Although it is more common for applicants to be 
“unwilling” to return, applicants can be “unable” to return if their countries 
refuse to issue passports, or if they are denied re-entry.76 
E.  Two Non-Precedential and a Third Useless BIA Decision 
The BIA has infrequently taken up the issue of domestic violence-based 
applications.77 The first two times the BIA addressed the matter were fruitless.78  
And the BIA’s most recent decision,79 which some argue settles the matter,80 
seems to be an unreliable source of guidance for future applicants.81 
1.  First Failed Opportunity to Provide Direction 
In the highly controversial case In re R-A-,82 the BIA reversed the grant of 
asylum to a Guatemalan woman who had endured over ten years of physical83 
and verbal violence.84  On two occasions, the police failed to respond to R-A-’s 
                                                        
 73. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012). 
 74. GERMAIN, supra note 20, § 1.1.1 (alteration in original). 
 75. Id. § 2.2. 
 76. Regina Germain, Seeking Refuge: The U.S. Asylum Process, COLO. LAW., Oct. 2006, at 
71, 72. 
 77. See Bookey, supra note 8, at 108–09 (stating that “no BIA or U.S. Federal Court of 
Appeals decision has squarely held that domestic violence is (or is not) a basis for asylum in the 
United States”). 
 78. See Matter of L-R-, supra note 4 (“[The] absence of applicable jurisprudential or 
regulatory norms have resulted in contradictory and arbitrary outcomes and the failure of protection 
for women victims of intimate partner violence.” (alteration in original)); see also discussion infra 
Sections I.E.1–I.E.2. 
 79. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 80. See Asylum Law, supra note 12, at 2090 (“[In re A-R-C-G-] unambiguously establishes 
that women fleeing domestic violence can be eligible for particular social group-based asylum, and 
it will prove to be a boon to future asylum applicants.” (alteration in original)). 
 81. See discussion infra Section I.E.3. 
 82. 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 83. See id. at 908–09.  R-A- married at the age of sixteen and was almost immediately 
subjected to physical and sexual abuse by her husband.  Id.  While in the relationship, R-A- suffered 
a dislocated jaw when her menstrual period was late, violent kicking in her spine after she refused 
to have an abortion, rape on a near-daily basis, kicking in the genitalia, sodomization, whippings 
with an electrical cord, threats to chop her limbs off so that she could never leave, pistol whippings, 
use of her head to break mirrors and windows, and blows to her head with fists and furniture.  Id. 
 84. See id. at 908–10.  R-A-’s husband often threatened that “calling the police would be 
futile” because he was well-connected due to his previous military service.  Id. at 909.  He would 
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phone calls; and three times, police took no action when her husband failed to 
appear pursuant to a summons.85  Moreover, when R-A- had the opportunity to 
be heard in court, a Guatemalan judge told her “he would not interfere in 
domestic disputes.”86  In May 1995, R-A- fled to the United States in search of 
protection.87  It took her fourteen years of litigation to get a final decision. 
Initially, R-A-’s application for asylum was granted.88   The Immigration 
Judge (IJ) concluded that asylum was warranted because “of her membership in 
the particular social group of ‘Guatemalan women who have been involved 
intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to 
live under male domination.’” 89   The then-Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) appealed the IJ’s decision, arguing that R-A- had not claimed a 
valid PSG and that she was not subjected to harm on account of her membership 
in that group.90  Although the BIA found that R-A- was the “victim of tragic and 
severe spouse abuse,” it refused to find that the abuse “occurred because of her 
membership in a particular social group,” and thus, denied R-A- asylum.91 
The BIA found that R-A- failed to prove that her claimed PSG was 
“recognized and understood to be a societal faction, or . . . otherwise a 
recognized segment of the population, within Guatemala.”92   The BIA also 
found that R-A- did not show that “spouse abuse is itself an important societal 
attribute, or, in other words, that the characteristic of being abused is one that is 
important within Guatemalan society.”93  Additionally, even if a PSG could be 
found, R-A- had not established the nexus requirement as she did not show that 
“her husband ha[d] targeted and harmed [her] because he perceived her to be a 
member of this particular social group.”94  Also, she had failed “to show how 
other members of the group may be at risk of harm from him.”95  Finally, the 
                                                        
also tell stories of killing babies and elderly people during his tenure in the army, and declare that 
she would never be able to leave.  Id. 
 85. Id. at 909. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. The Immigration Judge: 
[F]ound that such a group was cognizable and cohesive, as members shared the common 
and immutable characteristics of gender and the experience of having been intimately 
involved with a male companion who practices male domination through violence . . . 
[and had] held that members of such a group are targeted for persecution by the men who 
seek to dominate and control them. 
Id. at 911 (alteration in original) (Board of Immigration Appeals reviewing Immigration Judge’s 
unpublished findings). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 927. 
 92. Id. at 918. 
 93. Id. at 919. 
 94. Id. at 920 (alteration in original). 
 95. Id. 
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BIA determined that the husband’s actions did not “represent desired behavior 
within Guatemala or that the Guatemalan Government encourages domestic 
abuse.”96 
In direct response to the controversial BIA decision, proposed regulations 
were issued for public comment in December 2000,97 clarifying what constitutes 
a PSG and setting out a number of factors that could be added to claim review.98  
In addition, Attorney General (AG) Janet Reno vacated the BIA’s decision 
pending the issuance of final regulations.99  However, final regulations were 
never adopted.100 
In the next administration, AG John Ashcroft certified In re R-A- to himself, 
and accepted new briefs in February 2004.101  The Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) argued that R-A- should be granted asylum based on her 
membership in the PSG of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to 
leave the relationship.”102  Ashcroft eventually remanded the case to the BIA 
with instructions to decide the case once the final regulations were issued.103  In 
2008, AG Michael Mukasey also certified In re R-A- to himself. 104   He 
ultimately remanded the case back to the BIA, instructing it not to await final 
regulations, but to decide the case based on other precedent 105  that had 
developed in the interim.106 
Finally, in December 2009, R-A- was granted asylum.107  The IJ’s decision, 
which was one sentence, was based on the fact that the parties essentially agreed 
to grant asylum. 108   Thus, after fourteen years of litigation and wavering 
positions by the government and the BIA, domestic violence victims were left 
with no additional guidance as to how to prepare a successful asylum claim. 
2.  DHS Intervenes and a Resolution is Dodged Again 
A second unpublished case provided a potential solution but ultimately did 
not result in any concrete rules.109  In May 2004, L-R- and her three children 
                                                        
 96. Id. at 923. 
 97. DREE K. COLLOPY, AILA’S ASYLUM PRIMER 393 (7th ed. 2015). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 394. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 394–95. 
 105. See discussion supra Sections I.D.3.b.ii–I.D.3.b.iii. 
 106. COLLOPY, supra note 97, at 395. 
 107. Matter of L-R-, supra note 4. 
 108. See Natalie Rodriguez, Give Us Your Weary But Not Your Battered: The Department of 
Homeland Security, Politics and Asylum for Victims of Domestic Violence, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 317, 
333 (2011). 
 109. Matter of L-R-, supra note 4. 
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arrived in the United States seeking refuge after almost two decades of domestic 
violence.110  In her application, L-R- told numerous stories of substantial abuse 
perpetrated by her common-law husband for more than a decade.111  L-R- also 
explained that the police refused to assist her several times because it was a 
“private matter.”112  In 1991, L-R- fled to California to escape the abuse, but 
even then, he exerted control over her.113  He sent threats and forced her to send 
him money.114  Eventually, he forced L-R- to return to Mexico, and the beatings 
became even more violent.115  Following years of physical and mental abuse, L-
R- and her children once again fled to California in 2004.116 
The IJ denied L-R-’s asylum application, finding that the type of persecution 
she had suffered did not qualify her for asylum and that the abuse was not on 
account of membership in a PSG.117  L-R- appealed that decision to the BIA.118  
Though DHS initially filed a brief in support of the IJ’s decision,119 in 2009, it 
filed a supplemental brief that was more in line with its position in the R-A- 
case. 120   DHS proposed two new alternative groups: “Mexican women in 
domestic relationships who are unable to leave” and “Mexican women who are 
viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship.”121  
DHS also suggested that the case be remanded to the IJ so that L-R- could refine 
her claim according to the new proposed groups. 122   After reviewing the 
additional evidence, DHS stipulated that L-R-’s application was eligible for 
                                                        
 110. Id. 
 111. Amended Declaration of L-R- in Support of Application for Asylum at 2 (B.I.A. Dec. 30, 
2005), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20090716-asylum-support.pdf [hereinafter 
Amended Declaration of L-R-].  L-R- was a 19-year old college student when her 33-year old 
basketball coach began to abuse her.  Id. at 4.  The first time he raped her was at gunpoint, following 
her school graduation.  Id.  at 5.  When L-R- tried to leave the next day, he found her at the bus stop 
and forced her back to his house where he held her captive for several years.  Id. at 7–8.  He 
continued to rape L-R- and eventually she became pregnant.  Id. at 8.  When she was about two 
months pregnant, L-R- tried to escape, but he found her and forced her back to his house.  Id.  That 
night, while she was sleeping, he poured a flammable liquid all over the bed, and lit it and her on 
fire.  Id.  After the child was born, he continued to rape her, yell at her, and hit her—in private and 
in public.  Id. at 9. 
 112. Id. at 9. 
 113. Id. at 10. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 11.  One day, as she was walking home from her bus, he accused her of infidelity 
and hit her until he had dislocated her nose.  Id. at 12.  On another day, L-R- had threatened to go 
to the police after he had hit her, and in response, he took out a machete and threatened to kill her 
with it if she went to the police.  Id. 
 116. Id. at 22. 
 117. See Matter of L-R-, supra note 4. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Supplemental Brief for DHS at 29, Matter of L-R- (2009), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/ 
sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf. 
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asylum, and soon thereafter, the IJ ordered the grant of asylum.123  However, 
because the BIA, AG, and federal circuit courts are the only entities capable of 
creating binding precedential decisions, the IJ’s grant of asylum did not create 
any binding law that could help other domestic violence claimants. 
3.  An Ineffective, but Precedential, Decision is Issued 
In the landmark 2014 decision, In re A-R-C-G-,124 the BIA held that “women 
fleeing domestic violence can be members of a particular social group.”125  This 
decision marked the first time a binding decision had been issued on the matter 
of domestic violence.  The case involved a Guatemalan woman who faced 
“weekly beatings” and “suffered repugnant abuse by her husband.”126   She 
contacted the police for help on several occasions, but was repeatedly told that 
they “would not interfere in a marital relationship.”127  And when she tried to 
leave numerous times, he always found her.128  In December 2005, C-G- left 
Guatemala and sought asylum in the United States.129  The IJ determined that C-
G- failed to demonstrate eligibility for asylum, deciding that she had not suffered 
past persecution and that she did not have a well-founded fear of future 
persecution on account of membership in a PSG.130  Instead, she was simply the 
victim of arbitrary criminality. 131   Thus, the IJ denied C-G-’s asylum 
application.132  On appeal, C-G- argued that she was eligible for asylum based 
on the domestic violence she had suffered.133  However, DHS opined that the 
IJ’s decision should be upheld.134  As a result, the BIA sought out supplemental 
briefing and amici curiae “to address the issue whether domestic violence can, 
in some instances, form the basis for a claim of asylum . . . .”135  In response, 
DHS conceded that C-G- suffered past persecution and “that the persecution was 
on account of a particular social group comprised of ‘married women in 
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.’”136 
                                                        
 123. See Matter of L-R-, supra note 4. 
 124. 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 125. COLLOPY, supra note 97, at 396. 
 126. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389.  Throughout the relationship, her husband 
had broken her nose, burned her breast with paint thinner, and raped her.  Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 389–90. 
 131. Id. at 390. 
 132. Id. at 388. 
 133. Id. at 390. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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The BIA used the three-part test137 for establishing membership in a PSG 
(immutability, social distinction, and particularity) to review the case.138  With 
regard to immutability, the BIA held that gender is an immutable characteristic 
and that marital status could be deemed immutable if an individual is “unable to 
leave the relationship.” 139   The BIA also advised that it was necessary for 
adjudicators to “consider a respondent’s own experiences, as well as . . . 
background country information.” 140   Regarding the second element, DHS 
conceded that “the group in this case is defined with particularity”141 because of 
its composition of terms with commonly accepted definitions that, when 
combined, created “a group with discrete and definable boundaries.”142  Finally, 
the BIA held that the group was “socially distinct within the society in 
question.”143  In making this determination, the BIA recognized that it must 
“look to the evidence to determine whether a society . . . makes meaningful 
distinctions based on the common immutable characteristics of being a married 
woman in a domestic relationship that she cannot leave.”144  Such evidence may 
consider “whether the society in question recognizes the need to offer protection 
to victims of domestic violence, including whether the country has criminal laws 
designed to protect domestic abuse victims, whether those laws are effectively 
enforced, and other sociopolitical factors.” 145   In this case, the BIA found 
“unrebutted evidence that Guatemala has a culture of ‘machismo and family 
violence,’” and that laws against domestic violence were frequently not 
enforced.146  Finally, the BIA pointed out that the issue of social distinction is to 
be determined on a case-by-case basis.147 
As compared to the two previous decisions, In re A-R-C-G- made huge strides 
to set out a workable framework for future applicants.148  However, it still failed 
to rule that domestic violence is a type of persecution for which the United States 
                                                        
 137. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & 
N. 208, 212–13 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 138. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. at 392. 
 139. Id. at 392–93. 
 140. Id. at 393. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 394. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 395.  In making this determination, adjudicators should consider the facts and 
evidence, “including documented country conditions; law enforcement statistics and expert 
witnesses, if proferred; the respondent’s past experiences; and other reliable and credible sources 
of information.”  Id. at 394–95. 
 148. Asylum Law, supra note 12, at 2090 (“[A-R-C-G-] unambiguously establishes that women 
fleeing domestic violence can be eligible for particular social group-based asylum, and it will prove 
to be a boon to future asylum applicants.” (alteration in original)). 
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will give consistent protection. 149   Moreover, it still left much of the 
determination up to the reviewing officer’s discretion.150  Progress was made, 
but A-R-C-G- was not a solution. 
II.  PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED ASYLUM 
Because there has been little legislative guidance, and case law has been vague 
with respect to domestic violence-based asylum claims, a great deal of 
scholarship has developed regarding the best path forward.  Generally, these 
proposals can be sorted into two broad categories: gender-based and gender-
neutral approaches. 
A.  Gender-Based Solutions 
The vast majority of the solutions proposed for domestic violence victims 
seeking asylum look to employ an analysis that uses gender as the basis for the 
persecution.  Gender-based persecution “refers to those asylum applications 
made by women which are premised on issues that pertain specifically to their 
gender.”151  In other words, women are persecuted for the simple fact that they 
are women.  Three gender-based solutions are commonly proposed. 
1.  Adding Gender as the Sixth Ground for Asylum 
One proposal is that persecution based on gender, and more specifically, the 
persecution of women, should be added as the sixth ground for asylum.152  Under 
this approach, women would no longer have to try to shoehorn their claims into 
the PSG definition.153  Accordingly, this would ease the burden for a woman 
because she would only need to prove “persecution and that the persecution was 
                                                        
 149. Id. at 2095 (“The Board declined to analyze whether (1) the harm C.G. suffered amounted 
to persecution or (2) her membership in the particular social group was ‘at least one central reason’ 
for her persecution; the Board . . . explicitly affirmed that they will continue to be fact-dependent 
determinations.”). 
 150. Id. at 2093 (“While A-R-C-G- provides definitive answers to some questions that have 
split immigration judges, it provides less guidance on others; accordingly, it leaves open important 
questions about which victims of domestic violence will qualify for asylum.”). 
 151. Anjana Bahl, Home is Where the Brute Lives: Asylum Law and Gender-Based Claims of 
Persecution, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 33, 35 (1997). 
 152. See Leonard Birdsong, A Legislative Rejoinder to “Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, 
and Your Victims of Gender Violence, Yearning to Breathe Free of Sexual Persecution . . .,” 35 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 197, 222 (2008); Elizabeth A. Hueben, Note, Domestic Violence and 
Asylum Law: The United States Takes Several Remedial Steps in Recognizing Gender-Based 
Persecution, 70 UMKC L. REV. 453, 454 (2001); Sarah Siddiqui, Note, Membership in a Particular 
Social Group: All Approaches Open Doors for Women to Qualify, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 505, 524 
(2010). 
 153. Crystal Doyle, Note, Isn’t “Persecution” Enough? Redefining the Refugee Definition to 
Provide Greater Asylum Protection to Victims of Gender-Based Persecution, 15 WASH. & LEE J. 
CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 519, 548 (2009). 
2016] A-R-C-G- is not the Solution 177 
on account of her gender”154 along with a “well-founded fear of persecution and 
that her home government was unable or unwilling to control her persecutor.”155  
Additionally, this would bring American law “in line with existing international 
and current U.S. guidelines for adjudicating women’s claims.”156 
However, this approach would require showing that the persecution was “on 
account of” gender and not derived from one of the many other reasons for 
domestic violence, which would be very difficult to prove. 157   Moreover, 
because adjudicators have broad discretion in determining the “on account of” 
factor, the approach could lead to inconsistent applications. 
2.  Allowing Gender to be a PSG 
The most frequently proposed rule suggests allowing gender to comprise a 
PSG.  Two variations of this proposal exist: one in which “women” is the PSG, 
and another in which “women plus” forms the PSG. 
Proponents of the women-as-PSG theory base their proposals on the fact that 
In re Acosta “expressly acknowledged that sex may form a particular social 
group.”158  They argue that “if women can form a particular social group in 
[female genital mutilation] cases, there is no reason why this should not apply 
to women persecuted in other manners.”159  This standard classification has 
already received broad support in the international community.160  By including 
“women” within the definition of a PSG, more victims will benefit from 
protection.161 
However, some have criticized this formulation by arguing that a group 
cannot be “particular” if it “comprise[s] about half of society.”162  Furthermore, 
defining the PSG “as ‘women’ fails to address the complexity of [domestic 
violence] and thus renders refugees’ claims on this basis vulnerable to 
rejection.”163  Moreover, using “women” as the PSG does not address the nexus 
issue—the applicant must show that the persecutor was motivated by the fact 
that the victim is a woman.164 
                                                        
 154. Hueben, supra note 152, at 468. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Birdsong, supra note 152, at 222. 
 157. Doyle, supra note 153, at 554. 
 158. Allison W. Reimann, Comment, Hope for the Future? The Asylum Claims of Women 
Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1199, 1238 (2009). 
 159. Id. (alteration in original). 
 160. Id. at 1239–40. 
 161. See Doyle, supra note 153, at 548–49. 
 162. Id. at 548 (alteration in original); Helen P. Grant, The Floodgates Are Not Going to Open, 
but Will the U.S. Border?, 29 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 43 (2006) (“Size of the social group is . . . an 
important issue in determining whether a particular social group has been recognized.”). 
 163. Laura S. Adams, Fleeing the Family: A Domestic Violence Victim’s Particular Social 
Group, 49 LOY. L. REV. 287, 294 (2003) (alteration in original). 
 164. Doyle, supra note 153, at 551 (“[A]sylum is only available to individuals persecuted on 
account of one of the five grounds.”); Michael G. Heyman, Protecting Foreign Victims of Domestic 
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Another theory proposes that the PSG should be defined as gender (women) 
“plus” some specific characteristic.165  One suggestion classifies “women who 
have fled severely abusive relationships” as a PSG.166   In this formulation, 
leaving an abusive relationship is considered an immutable characteristic 
because the woman would not be able to “change the fact that she took the actual 
step of leaving” the relationship.167  Even if she returns, once she has challenged 
her abuser’s power by leaving, there is a risk the abuser will increase the volume 
or severity of his or her violent behavior to reestablish dominance.168  Thus, the 
woman can likely show that she is being (or will be) persecuted on account of 
the fact that she tried to flee the relationship.169 
A second variation of the “gender plus” test recommends the use of nationality 
as the “plus” factor.170  Under this approach, “domestic violence . . . occur[s] on 
account of the victim’s gender and their nationality or tribal membership, which 
allows for women to be harmed with impunity.” 171  Accordingly, this 
formulation “gets to the heart of the issue: that women from these countries have 
fled to the United States because their home country perpetuates sexist and 
abusive behavior and allows for women to be so abused.”172 
The gender plus formulation has garnered support in the Second, Ninth, and 
Tenth Circuits.173  Yet, some have criticized it for over-defining the PSG by 
                                                        
Violence: An Analysis of Asylum Regulations, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 133 (2008) 
(“The refugee definition still requires the applicant to show that she fears persecution because of 
her gender.”). 
 165. Lauren N. Kostes, Note, Domestic Violence and American Asylum Law: The Complicated 
and Convoluted Road Post Matter of A-R-C-G-, 30 CONN. J. INT’L L. 211, 232 (2015); see also 
Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger: Separation Violence as a Basis 
for Refugee Protection for Battered Women, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 362 (2009) (explaining that 
gender can be considered a viable social group when combined with other refugee protection 
criteria). 
 166. Cianciarulo & David, supra note 165, at 378. 
 167. Id. at 379 (“The most fundamental concept of a valid social group is a characteristic of 
belief that a member cannot change, or one that is so fundamental to her identity that she should 
not be required to change it.”). 
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. at 378–79 (“The punishable characteristic is the applicant’s ability and willingness 
to challenge her abuser’s authority by leaving the relationship.”). 
 170. Kostes, supra note 165, at 232. 
 171. Id. at 233–34 (alteration in original) (“In some countries, the idea of ‘wife-beating’ is a 
‘corrective’ measure to punish women for any transgression her husband or partner sees fit is 
acceptable, normal, and held by both genders.”). 
 172. Id. at 233. 
 173. Id.; see also Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 663–64, 667 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that 
the BIA erred in concluding that a social group consisting of all young women in Guatemala was 
overly broad and not a PSG); Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that a 
petitioner’s gender combined with her ethnicity, nationality, or tribal membership was sufficient to 
satisfy the PSG requirement); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1200 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting 
the BIA’s argument that petitioners must prove more than gender plus tribal membership for PSG 
classification). 
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adding descriptors to the “women” group, causing the potential exclusion of 
some women seeking protection from the same form of persecution. 174  
Additionally, while the gender plus formulation seems to be favored by asylum 
adjudicators and has had some sporadic success, it has also “caused serious 
jurisprudential problems . . . that have limited the capacity of this method to 
provide asylum protection to all victims . . . .”175   These narrowly defined 
classifications also “create new hurdles for refugee applicants, who generally 
struggle to prove that this shared characteristic is identifiable by would-be 
persecutors or that their past persecution makes them a target for future 
persecution.”176 
3.  Modifying the Nexus Analysis 
The third prominent gender-based solution derives from international 
standards and calls for a bifurcated nexus approach to the PSG analysis. 177  
Under this approach, an asylum applicant has two routes for establishing that 
persecution was on account of her gender.178  The applicant could argue that the 
persecution occurred on account of her gender and that the state is unable or 
                                                        
 174. See Stacey Kounelias, Comment, Asylum Law and Female Genital Mutilation: 
“Membership in a Particular Social Group” Inadequately Protecting Persecuted Women, 11 
SCHOLAR 577, 582 (2009) (explaining that women who fear they may undergo female genital 
mutilation can be considered a PSG but only if the woman can prove female genital mutilation is 
an established practice in a tribe or clan). 
 175. Doyle, supra note 153, at 549; see also id. at 537 (recognizing that the international 
community has accepted that persecution based on gender can form the foundation for an asylum 
claim, but that approaches incorporating gender into a PSG have been unsatisfactory). 
 176. Siddiqui, supra note 152, at 517 (emphasizing that victimized women who may attempt 
to seek asylum will continue to encounter insurmountable hurdles until gender is recognized as a 
PSG because gender plus formulations create PSG definitions that are too narrow and under-
inclusive). 
 177. See, e.g., Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A 
Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777, 807–08 (2003) 
(discussing how the BIA had wavered in utilizing a bifurcated nexus approach and suggesting that 
it adopt the approach in In re R-A- to bring the United States in line with international standards); 
Reimann, supra note 158, at 1257 (suggesting that the United States should adopt a bifurcated 
nexus analysis in gender persecution asylum cases in order to bring its jurisprudence in line with 
the international community); Siddiqui, supra note 152, at 523 (explaining that a bifurcated nexus 
approach would create a causal link between a non-state abuser and the State’s inability or 
unwillingness to protect the victim from abuse).  It should be noted that the BIA rejected the use of 
a bifurcated approach in the appeal of In re R-A-.  In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 923 (B.I.A. 
2001). 
 178. Musalo, supra note 177, at 806.  In this analysis, the “on account of” element would be 
satisfied: 
(1) where there is a real risk of being persecuted at the hands of a non-state actor for 
reasons which are related to one of the Convention grounds, whether or not the failure of 
the State to protect the claimant is Convention related; or (2) where the risk of being 
persecuted at the hands of a non-state actor is unrelated to a Convention ground, but the 
inability or unwillingness of the State to offer protection is for a Convention reason. 
Id. 
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unwilling to provide protection against the abuser.179  Or, the applicant could 
argue that “whatever the reasons for her husband’s actions, the state is unwilling 
to protect her because of her gender.”180  This analysis would ease the burden of 
the applicant because it would remove the requirement that applicants prove the 
persecutor’s motivations and would refocus the inquiry on the government’s 
refusal to provide protection.181  The bifurcated nexus has been utilized in the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia, and has been explicitly adopted 
by The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) guidelines.182 
4.  General Criticism of Gender-Based Approaches 
The overarching problem with a gender-based approach is that it ignores that 
domestic violence victims can be male183 or female, and that domestic violence 
can occur in heterosexual or homosexual relationships.184  While women may 
be most willing to seek asylum based on domestic violence, there is no need to 
close the door to men equally in need of protection.  Some argue that men are 
better protected around the world, but in countries where men are largely in 
power and a “machismo” attitude prevails, men are unlikely to receive protection 
for domestic violence because their cultures generally expect that they should be 
able to protect themselves.185  Others may want to argue that men are better 
equipped to deal with domestic violence because of their inherent strength, but 
this is not true of a physically disabled man who is abused by his spouse and 
                                                        
 179. Siddiqui, supra note 152, at 523. 
 180. Id. at 524. 
 181. See Musalo, supra note 177, at 779, 786 (asserting that when non-state actors are 
involved, women have substantial difficulty showing a causal connection between their abuser’s 
conduct and their gender because there is a presumption that the motivation underlying the abuse 
is personal rather than related to the woman’s gender). 
 182. Id. at 779. 
 183. There exists some debate regarding whether men are, or can be, victims of domestic 
violence.  See Mary Z. Silverzweig, Domestic Terrorism: The Debate and Gender Divides, 12 J. L. 
& FAM. STUD. 251, 251–52 (2010) (reviewing MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE (2008)); see also discussion supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the 
findings of several studies regarding domestic violence against women and men). 
 184. See Shannon Little, Challenging Changing Legal Definitions of Family in Same-Sex 
Domestic Violence, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 259, 260–61 (2008) (finding that some studies 
suggest that domestic violence occurs in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) 
relationships at a rate comparable to heterosexual relationships, and that men in same-sex 
relationships are twice as likely to experience domestic violence than men in heterosexual 
relationships). 
 185. Campbell, supra note 2 (“Men are reluctant to say that they’ve been abused by women, 
because it’s seen as unmanly and weak.”).  British men’s rights campaign organization, Parity, 
claims that “men are often treated as ‘second-class victims’ and that many police forces and 
councils do not take them seriously.”  Id. 
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may not even be able to try to protect himself.186  Similarly, a person in a same-
sex relationship may already be subject to prejudice due to the nature of the 
relationship and is unlikely to receive protection.187  Ultimately, “gender does 
not explain why domestic violence . . . is also perpetrated against men by 
women, and occurs in same-sex relationships.”188 
B.  Gender-Neutral Solutions 
A second category of proposals presents gender-neutral solutions to the 
domestic violence-based asylum issue.  The solutions that are put forth in this 
category seek to modernize the asylum process more generally. 
1.  Eliminating the Grounds for Asylum 
One radical gender-neutral solution that has been put forth is the elimination 
of the five enumerated protected grounds, which would also eliminate the 
problematic “on account of” requirement.189  This proposal is based on the fact 
that the current grounds for asylum are “no longer appropriate,” because the 
original law had been drafted to protect war refugees, and was “not necessarily 
concerned with developing criteria that would be applicable to all people in all 
places for all times.”190 
2.  Defining Family as a PSG 
A second proposal aims to shift the focus from the reason underlying the abuse 
to the state’s failure to protect the victim.191  Accordingly, under this approach, 
the law would “provide international protection where a state fails to protect its 
own citizens from harm,”192 and the PSG would be defined as “the family.”193  
This PSG would challenge the assertion that asylum law cannot protect domestic 
                                                        
 186. See Bayes-Weiner, supra note 10, at 1060 (providing that the Obama administration’s 
asylum plan would preclude disabled men on the basis of domestic violence because of their 
gender). 
 187. It is not difficult to picture a scenario where a man in a same sex relationship is not given 
assistance because men are considered to be of equal strength and therefore capable of protecting 
themselves.  See Maya Shwayder, A Same-Sex Domestic Violence Epidemic Is Silent, THE 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/11/a-same-sex-dom 
estic-violence-epidemic-is-silent/281131/ (suggesting that a police officer may tell two men to 
“work it out between yourselves”).  Similarly, it is easy to imagine a scenario in which women are 
considered incapable of committing domestic violence, and therefore another woman complaining 
of domestic abuse is ignored.  See Britni de la Cretaz, When Women Abuse Other Women, GOOD 
HOUSEKEEPING (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/life/relationships/a37015/ 
intimate-partner-violence-in-lesbian-relationships/. 
 188. Adams, supra note 163, at 288. 
 189. Doyle, supra note 153, at 554. 
 190. Id. at 556. 
 191. Adams, supra note 163, at 295–96. 
 192. Id. at 296. 
 193. Id. at 298. 
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violence victims because domestic violence is a matter of private harm.194  As 
one commenter described, such an argument would be foreclosed because: 
[A] state makes a political choice when it relegates the issue of 
domestic violence to the private realm.  That choice generates the 
potential basis for a refugee claim, in that the state is now singling out 
a particular group within society—the family—for differential 
treatment that may lead to serious harm to members of the group.195 
3.  Family + Psychology as a PSG 
Building off of the previous theory and employing a psychological 
understanding of domestic violence, one scholar has recommended the inclusion 
of a PSG defined as “Family Whose Member Violates and Controls Them 
Without Government Intercession.”196  In this model, “Intimate Terrorism or 
Coercive Controlling Violence”197 is pinpointed as the specific type of domestic 
violence that is most likely to rise to the level of persecution that would render 
an applicant eligible for asylum.198  This type of abuse includes severe physical 
abuse, but also employs a “pattern of power, intimidation, and control.”199  
Additionally, this PSG identifies “the country of origin’s failure to protect the 
victim as [the] causal nexus.”200  This approach has three benefits.  First, it would 
recognize “all victims, not just women, who meet the criteria for asylum as 
domestic violence victims, no matter how rare the circumstances.”201  Second, it 
would specify the type of domestic violence that the United States is willing to 
recognize and for which it will provide protection.202  And third, this approach 
would place the focus on the government’s failure to protect, and not force the 
victim to explain and present evidence regarding why he or she was 
persecuted.203 
                                                        
 194. See id. (“Domestic violence is more than a private harm because the state fails to protect 
victims of violence within families for the reason that these victims are members of a particular 
social group . . . .”). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Bayes-Weiner, supra note 10, at 1058. 
 197. Id. at 1049. 
 198. Id. at 1049–50. 
 199. Id. at 1050.  (“Control is perpetrated by any of the following means in varying 
combinations based on the abuser’s preference: ‘intimidation; emotional abuse; isolation; 
minimizing, denying and blaming; use of children; asserting male privilege; economic abuse; and 
coercion and threats.’” (quoting Joan B. Kelly & Michael P. Johnson, Domestic Violence: 
Differentiation Among Types of Intimate Partner Violence: Research Update and Implications for 
Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 476 (2008))). 
 200. Bayes-Weiner, supra note 10, at 1058 (alteration in original). 
 201. Id. at 1059. 
 202. Id.  This would also ease fears of opening the floodgate to excessive immigration, since 
only eleven percent of cases consist of this type of violence.  Id. 
 203. Id. 
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C.  Current Proposals Do Not Provide Consistent Protection 
A significant amount of scholarship has been dedicated to improving the 
current asylum system.  Some have built upon prior case law while others have 
looked to psychology or sociology for a solution.204  But in the end, most fail to 
articulate the ideal solution—Congressional acknowledgement that domestic 
violence is a form of persecution that the United States is willing to protect 
against. 
III.  BOLD ACTION IS NECESSARY FOR A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION 
At first glance, the BIA’s decision in In re A-R-C-G- appears to solve many 
of the problems that plagued domestic violence asylum applicants in the past.  
The decision (finally) created the binding precedent that “women fleeing 
domestic violence can be eligible” for asylum based on membership in a PSG.205  
However, it left open two important questions.  First, the BIA did not address 
whether the harm suffered would amount to persecution, and second, because 
the DHS conceded the nexus requirement, the Board did not give any guidance 
regarding how the nexus requirement could be fulfilled in future cases.206  Thus, 
In re A-R-C-G- only nominally clarified whether asylum may be predicated on 
domestic violence grounds.  As a result, it is again left up to the IJs and the courts 
to determine when domestic violence is a suitable ground for asylum.  This is 
problematic because it leaves too much discretion to adjudicators and reinforces 
the system of inconsistent decision-making that preceded In re A-R-C-G-.207  
Legislative action is needed to remedy the problems that have afflicted the 
adjudication of domestic violence-based asylum claims.  An amendment to the 
definition of “refugee” and the creation of a new PSG are two methods by which 
the issue may be resolved. 
A.  Appending Domestic Violence to the Refugee Definition 
One potential solution is to append a sentence to the definition of “refugee” 
identifying the circumstances by which domestic violence would qualify for 
                                                        
 204. See, e.g., Cianciarulo & David, supra note 165, at 379 (“Leaving an abusive relationship 
is an immutable characteristic. . . . The psychology of abusive relationships is such that the abuser 
continues the physical and emotional abuse specifically to establish and maintain control over his 
partner, and to punish any challenge to that control.”); Kostes, supra note 165, at 233–34 
(advocating for nationality as a “plus” factor on the basis that in some cultures women are presumed 
to be the property of men); Musalo, supra note 177, at 797–98 (advocating for the reinvigoration 
of the bifurcated nexus approach in light of the precedential authority of a pair of BIA decisions—
In re Kasinga and In re R-A-). 
 205. Asylum Law, supra note 12, at 2090. 
 206. Id. at 2095. 
 207. Id. at 2093.  One study of 206 asylum cases based on domestic violence found that 
“whether a woman fleeing domestic violence will receive protection in the United States seems to 
depend not on the consistent application of objective principles, but rather on the view of her 
individual judge, often untethered to any legal principles at all.”  Bookey, supra note 8, at 147–48. 
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asylum.208  While this may sound like a radical approach, it is premised on 
previous congressional action.  Again, Congress amended the definition of 
“refugee” in 1996 to address the grave needs of a particular group being 
persecuted.209  Like the issues that prompted Congress to act in 1996, domestic 
violence is similarly grave.  Thus, Congress should make a similar change to 
INA section 1101(a)(42).210  Specifically, a satisfactory definition would state: 
For the purposes of determination under this Act, a person who has 
been subjected to abuse of the ‘Intimate Terrorism or Coercive 
Controlling Violence’ 211  type, and who can show that the home 
government is unable or unwilling to provide protection from the 
abuse, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of their 
membership in a particular social group. 
Such an amendment would serve two important purposes: (1) Congress would 
define the precise type of domestic violence that rises to the level of persecution, 
and (2) it would reorient the focus of the analysis to the home government’s 
inaction.  This proposed solution clearly delineates the PSG for an asylum claim 
to be based on domestic violence.  Although “Intimate Terrorism or Coercive 
Controlling Violence” is potentially burdensome to prove, it still provides an 
unambiguous standard.212   In any case, this appears to be the type of domestic 
violence that has warranted asylum in the past.213 
B.  Adding Domestic Relationship Status as Sixth Basis for Asylum 
An alternate adequate solution would be to amend the definition of “refugee” 
to incorporate “domestic relationship status” as the sixth ground for asylum.  
This would allow an asylum applicant to claim persecution (the domestic 
violence) on account of domestic relationship status.214  The addition of this new 
                                                        
 208. Other scholars have made similar proposals.  See Rodriguez, supra note 108, at 338; 
Spencer Kyle, Safety Over Semantics: The Case for Statutory Protection for Domestic Violence 
Asylum Applicants, 16 SCHOLAR 505, 543–44 (2014).  However, this Comment is more forceful 
and direct in its proposed changes. 
 209. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
 210. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 601, 110 Stat. 3009-689 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012)). 
 211. See Bayes-Weiner, supra note 10, at 1049–50. 
 212. See id. at 1059–60. 
 213. Id. at 1050. 
 214. This proposal differs from others because it takes the domestic violence victim entirely 
out of the PSG configuration.  Instead, domestic violence would be a new basis of asylum, in 
addition to the current grounds of “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, [and] political opinion.”   Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000)).  Additionally, this proposal is different from 
previous PSG configuration proposals that employed the “domestic relationship” language because 
it does not make use of any qualifiers.  See, e.g., CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE-BASED ASYLUM CLAIMS: CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY 11 (2014), 
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/Domestic%20Violence-Based%20 
Asylum%20Claims%20(Sept%2012,%202014).pdf (“Specific to Ms. L.R., DHS advanced two 
2016] A-R-C-G- is not the Solution 185 
ground would be premised on the “well-established doctrine of ejusdem 
generis”215 because individuals in a domestic relationship are arguably unable to 
avoid persecution, because governments are unwilling to interfere in the “private 
affairs” of a relationship.  Additionally, although the BIA did not make this 
finding in In re Acosta, another shared characteristic is that this type of 
persecution occurs at high levels around the world.216   Similarly, domestic 
violence on account of status in a domestic relationship is a problem that plagues 
all countries and sexes, and at extraordinary rates. 217   Thus, “domestic 
relationship status” could rationally be added as the sixth ground of persecution. 
This approach would have several substantial benefits.  First, by using 
“domestic relationship status,” the ground remains gender-neutral and affords 
protection to both women and men.  Although it is difficult to determine how 
many men have attempted to use domestic violence as a basis for asylum because 
such detailed statistics are not made available, the statistics do make clear that 
men are subject to domestic violence, and thus, they should not be foreclosed 
from protection simply because the numbers are relatively small.218  Second, it 
allows domestic violence victims to bypass the difficult test of proving 
membership in a PSG.219  Third, this new ground should more easily meet the 
“on account of” element than the proposal to add gender as a sixth basis for 
asylum.220  Specifically, adding “domestic relationship status” would comport 
with the BIA’s finding in In re R-A- that “the husband’s focus was on the 
respondent because she was his wife, not because she was a member of some 
broader collection of women, however defined, whom he believed warranted the 
                                                        
formulations of a social group that it argued could meet the immutability, visibility, and 
particularity requirements, depending on the facts in the record: Mexican women in domestic 
relationships who are unable to leave; or (2) Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue 
of their positions within a domestic relationship.”); see also Supplemental Brief for DHS at 14, 
Matter of L-R (2009), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_ 
4_13_2009.pdf. 
 215. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (“[The] doctrine holds that 
general words used in an enumeration with specific words should be construed in a manner 
consistent with the specific words.” (alteration in original)). 
 216. Facts and Figures: Ending Violence against Women, UN WOMEN (last updated Feb. 
2016), http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-fig 
ures#notes (“It is estimated that 35 percent of women worldwide have experienced either physical 
and/or sexual intimate partner violence or sexual violence by a non-partner at some point in their 
lives.”); see Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (“The shared characteristic might be an innate 
one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience 
such as former military leadership or land ownership.”). 
 217. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
 218. For instance, a commenter to an article about the Matter of A-R-C-G- decision claims to 
“have a number of cases in which the victims are men and boys.”  Comment by username S K 
Williams to article by, Amy Grenier, Landmark Decision on Asylum Claims Recognizes Domestic 
Violence Victims, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Sept. 2, 2014), http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/ 
09/02/landmark-decision-on-asylum-claims-recognizes-domestic-violence-victims/. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
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infliction of harm.”221  Finally, by singling out domestic violence as a unique 
form of persecution, it accords the proper level of scrutiny that domestic 
violence deserves.  It creates a universal awareness that domestic violence will 
not be tolerated and also puts pressure on other countries to follow suit. 
C.  The “Floodgates” Argument Rebutted 
Many scholars have asserted that the reason Congress has not yet stepped in 
to resolve the domestic violence-based asylum issue is that there are fears that 
once a precise rule is produced, it “will open the floodgates.”222  In other words, 
“the borders would open beyond all reason,” risking “American economic and 
social well-being.”223  The fear is intensified by the fact that statistics show that 
domestic violence is endemic in Central American countries.224   Such high 
levels of domestic violence coupled with Central America’s proximity to the 
United States may incite the (irrational) fear that too many victims will head for 
the American border.225  However, concerns over the supposed floodgates effect 
are overstated because (1) the refugee definition inherently limits asylum 
applications, and (2) such an effect has not been experienced in other countries 
that have made such a transition.226 
                                                        
 221. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 921 (B.I.A. 1999).  The Board relied on a series of 
statements by R-A- and her recollection of statements made by her husband that explained the 
abuse.  Id. at 914–15.  He told her “You’re my woman and I can do whatever I want” and “You’re 
my woman, you do what I say.”  Id. at 915.  She testified that “he saw her ‘as something that 
belonged to him and he could do anything he wanted’ with her” and that “as time went on, he hit 
[her] for no reason at all” and he “would hit or kick [her] whenever he felt like it.”  Id. at 909, 915. 
 222. Grant, supra note 162, at 5; see Jessica Marsden, Note, Domestic Violence Asylum After 
Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE L.J. 2512, 2553 (2014) (contending that the floodgates argument is 
unprincipled); Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or 
Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 132 (2007) [hereinafter Musalo, 
Protecting Victims]; Reimann, supra note 158, at 1258; Rodriguez, supra note 108, at 340. 
 223. Grant, supra note 162, at 5. 
 224. In Guatemala, “36% of all Guatemalan women who live with a male partner suffer 
domestic abuse.”  Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women, its Causes and Consequences: Mission to Guatemala, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/72/Add.3, 
at 11 (2005).  In El Salvador, a 2008 national survey found that “44% of women who had been 
married or lived with a partner had suffered psychological violence, 24% physical violence, and 
12% sexual violence.”  Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women, its Causes and Consequences: Follow-Up Mission to El Salvador, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/17/26/Add.2, at 7 (2011).  In Honduras, 74.6% of 16,000 complaints lodged in 2012 related 
to domestic violence.  Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence 
Against Women, its Causes and Consequences: Mission to Honduras, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/29/27/Add.1, at 1 (2015). 
 225. In 2014, roughly thirty three percent of the total asylum applicants in the United States 
derived from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (13,847 of 41,920).  See Asylum Statistics FY 
2010-2014, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/16/fy2010-fy2014-asylum-statistics-by-nationality.pdf. 
 226. See Grant, supra note 162, at 5–7, 53 (providing a more in-depth discussion on the 
“floodgates” topic). 
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First, the refugee definition has built-in safeguards to avoid the floodgates 
problem.227  Even if domestic violence is deemed to be a form of persecution, 
applicants would still need to meet the other preconditions for asylum: the 
domestic violence must rise to the adequate level of persecution, the fear of 
persecution is well-founded, the applicant must prove nexus, and that he or she 
is outside his or her country of nationality and is unable or unwilling to return 
because of the persecution.228  By its nature, the “outside country of nationality” 
element is one of the largest hurdles faced by potential asylum seekers. 229  
Specifically, leaving one’s home country can be an extremely difficult task 
because it requires significant resources,230 and, as is often the case in an abusive 
relationship, the victim may not have access to the financial resources needed to 
make the trip.231  Also, if the victim has children, he or she must make the 
difficult choice of either “leaving family behind, or exposing them to the risks 
of travel to the potential country of refuge.”232  This is further complicated 
because many countries require that the non-travelling parent provide 
permission to the travelling parent to move a child internationally.233  Thus, the 
victim could be charged with kidnapping if he or she tries to move the kids to 
safety without first obtaining permission from his or her abuser. 
Furthermore, past experience has proven that the floodgates theory should not 
be a concern.  In 1993, Canada accepted gender-based persecution claims as a 
legitimate ground for asylum.234  In the two years following, Canada received 
40,000 refugee claims, of which only two percent were identified as gender-
based.235   Similarly, in 1996, when the BIA recognized that female genital 
mutilation (FGM) could form the basis for a claim of persecution, 236  no 
substantial changes in applicant volume occurred.237  Accordingly, at the time 
                                                        
 227. Id. at 5–6. 
 228. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, §201, 94 Stat. 102, 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)(A) (2000)); supra Section I.D.3.a (defining the nexus requirement); see also Grant, 
supra note 162, at 52 (“[I]f they do flee and enter the border of the United States, they will only be 
entitled to asylum after establishing all of the requirements of the refugee definition, which . . . is 
not any easy task.”). 
 229. Grant, supra note 162, at 51 (“[B]efore she is able to seek asylum from the United States, 
she must reach or enter the U.S. border.”). 
 230. Id. at 52. 
 231. Musalo, Protecting Victims, supra note 222, at 133. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Marsden, supra note 222, at 2555. 
 234. See Grant, supra note 162, at 53; Musalo, Protecting Victims, supra note 222, at 133; see 
also Reimann, supra note 158, at 1217–18. 
 235. Grant, supra note 162, at 53 (“The [two percent] figure has not been broken down into 
cases of domestic violence, but these would only represent a portion of the two percent.” (alteration 
in original)). 
 236. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 237. See Questions and Answers: The R-A- Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & 
NATURALIZATION SERVS. (Dec. 7, 2000), http://iwp.legalmomentum.org/reference/additional-
materials/immigration/asylum/government-documents/R-A-
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the In re R-A- decision was made, the INS stated that it did not anticipate “a 
large number of claims based on domestic violence.”238  And, as one commenter 
pointed out, even when the “potential beneficiaries [of American asylum policy] 
included almost the entire adult female population of China,”239  the United 
States did not shy away from intervening on behalf of the victims of China’s 
one-child policy.240 
Finally, the potential size of the applicant pool should not bar the United States 
from taking action on domestic violence.  Asylum is currently allowed for 
anyone who can base his or her claim of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, or political opinion—grounds that are broad and relatively 
unrestricted, and grounds that did open up the United States to a flood of 
applicants.241  Yet, asylum is permitted upon these grounds because we believe 
that such persecution is so fundamentally wrong that it requires intervention.  
Accordingly, by protecting the victims of such persecution, we send a message 
to the world that these actions will not be tolerated.  As the United States has 
done time and time again, it should officially recognize domestic violence as a 
viable grounds for asylum claims, to demonstrate to the world that domestic 
violence is similarly intolerable. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For more than fifteen years, IJs have grappled with the domestic violence 
asylum applicant.  The results have been pathetic—decisions are inconsistent 
and fueled by personal beliefs and judgments.  This has put many victims at risk 
of continued persecution.  In 1996, Congress took the extraordinary step of 
changing the refugee definition to provide Chinese victims of coercive 
population control methods a systematic route to asylum.  Now, it is time for 
Congress to acknowledge that domestic violence is a form of persecution that 
requires similar action.  The United States must demonstrate to other countries 
that domestic violence will no longer be dismissed as a private matter or a mere 
by-product of cultural norms.  By amending the refugee definition and 
promulgating specific standards, the domestic violence issue could be addressed 
definitively and victims could finally be afforded the protection that the refugee 
laws are meant to deliver. 
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